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Introduction 
An important area in the study of public policy has been research dir ecte d 
at assessing the consequences of polic y action. Generally conducted under the 
heading of program evaluation , the researc h attention has centered both on 
the development of appropriate methodologies for evaluation analysis as well 
as th e measureme nt of the results of substantive policy actions. Relatively 
little attention, however , has be en directed at th e various assumptions which 
underlie much of the research in th e area of program evaluation. In this paper 
we will address several of the major assumptions and discuss their relev ance to 
the conduct of an evaluation analysis. In particular, we will discuss the 
potential impact of these assumptions on issues such as the scope of the 
evaluation, the choice of evaluative criteria, and the type of research design 
emp loyed. While we do not assume that the list of assumptions discussed is 
exhaustive, we do intend that it be provocative and, we hop e, representative 
of the assumptions underlying program evaluation in various substantive 
contexts. 
Terminology 
In general terms , program evaluation may be conceptualized as the re-
search enterprise concerned with analyzing the relationship between pro-
gram intentions and program performance. More specifically, it measur es the 
extent to which a program action was successful in achieving its intended goals 
or objectives. 1 In principle the output from a program evaluation serves as 
input (i.e. , feedback on program results ) for decision-making about future 
resource allocations (e.g ., to continue, modify , or discontinue a program ). 
One can easily find numerous candidates for a program evaluation. Will a 
Volunteer-in-Probation program significant ly decrease the probability of re-
cidivism among adult misdemeanants? Will a high-intensity street lighting 
program significantly decrease the incidence of on-street assaults in a given 
'Thomas J. Cook and Frank P. Scioli, Jr ., "A Resea rch Strategy for Analyzing the Impacts of 
Public Policy .·· Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (September , 1972), 328-339 ; and Thom as J. 
Coo k and Frank P. Scioli, Jr ., "Impact Analysis in Political Science Resea rch " in K. Dolb eare 
(ed. ), Policy Evaluation (Beverly Hills. Ca. : Sage Publi shin g Co., 1975). 
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area? Will an income maint enance program be an incentive for finding 
employment? Will an "operation identification " progr am significantly in-
crease the recovery of stolen property by those victimized? These are all 
potential targets for a program evaluation. Although the programs differ , the 
general research problem is the same: determining the specific effects which 
may reasonably be attributed to a given program activity. 
Important to an appreciation of this type of research is an understanding of 
the assumptive behavior which guides much of the evaluative research. By 
assumptions, we mean those aspects of evaluation research which are "taken 
for granted," or at least not tested directly , and yet may have important 
consequences for either the social utility of the program or the validity of the 
eva luation conclusions. For example, one might adopt a narrow view of 
program impact , and , consequently, conduct observations on a limited set of 
impact indicators. This narrow view may reflect the assumption that only 
positive or beneficial, consequences will result from a particular activity. 
Much of the Volunteers-in-Probation movement is characterized by this 
viewpoint, that is, if a person volunteers his time , he or she must be doing 
some good. In many cases, there is a reluctanc e to admit the possibility of 
negative effects resulting from volunteer-probationer interaction , such as in 
one-to-one counseling. Thus, the assumption of "only positive results " may 
limit the types of indicators selected for measuring program impact and set 
boundaries on the scope of program consequences which cou ld be measur ed . 
In this paper we will focus on various assumptions dealing with the values , or 
subjective preferenc es, which may influence the conduct of a program evalua-
tion . 
Value assumptions got to the very heart of the evaluation enterprise and 
pertain to the basic premises upon which the research is conducted. They 
raise issues about the principles which should guide evaluation research such 
as the "legitimate" purposes of evaluation research and the "proper role" of 
the program evaluator. In other words, what questions ought to be asked and 
how should they be investigated? Value assumptions are important, as they 
often estab lish the boundaries for the evaluative effort in that they set limits as 
to the scope and nature of the questions asked vis-a-vis the determination of 
program "success." In most cases they are implicit, rather than explicit, and 
the prescriptive guidelines suggested by the assumptions are followed in the 
absence of any justifying evidence, empirical or otherwise. As the discussion 
below will point out, there is also somewhat less than a perfect consensus on 
the "best " set of prescriptive gujdelines to be followed in a program evalua-
tion. 
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Value Assumptions 
The first assumption deals with program evaluation as a competitor for 
resources in the over-all budgetary allocation of a program . The pro-
evaluation assumption is that every program can, and should, be evaluated. 
Moreover , it is assumed that a program , even before it is funded , should have 
built into it the mechanism for determining whether or not the program was a 
success. An example of this is the provision in Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) funding which requires that funded programs must 
have an evaluation component. Th e trade-off here is that money spent for 
evaluation is not available for providing program service, or treatment. Thus , 
the opportunity-cost of deni ed treatment is balanced against the desire for 
information about the extent to which a program is achieving its objectives. It 
is assumed in this type of budgetary situation that the value of the program 
evaluation (expressed in terms of providing more efficient and effective ser-
vice in the future ) outweighs the short-run deprivation of individuals who 
would otherwise receive the service contained within the program. 
A corollary point of a methodological nature deals with the use of control 
groups in program evaluation. The argument here is that a more valid evalua-
tion can only be obtained when a treatment group is compared against a group 
which did not receive a particular treatment , in order to have a comparative 
baseline from which to as ess the impact of a particular program. We label this 
the "control group dilemma " in that a control group is denied a service that 
"may" be of great benefit in order that the researchers maximize the value of 
obtaining a "va lid" evaluation. 
The counter argument contends that it is wrong to deny a potentially 
beneficial service to a group of people merely to achieve a desired level of 
methodological sophistication. One often hears this argument from personnel 
responsible for administering a program. Their contention is that "we're too 
busy helping the people in the program to take time out for evaluation, and 
besides it's wrong to deny people a service they really need. " The rebuttal, of 
course, is "how do you know the program is effective, and meets the needs of 
the people, unless you've systematically evaluated it?" Thus, we have a 
conflict in values - allocation of resources to provide service vs. the allocation 
of resources to determine service effectiveness. 
A related dispute is relevant to the contention that every program can, and 
should, be evaluated. One position is that some evaluation is better than none 
at all, regardless of the data limitations present in the evaluation setting. The 
converse position is that of foregoing an evaluation of a program where the 
design of the evaluation is severely constrained by the available data and there 
is high probability of inconclusive , or misleading, results. The debate of 
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Campbell and Erl ebac her vs. the Westinghouse Group is illustrativ e of this 
point. 2 Campbell and Erlebacher contend that the Head Start evaluations had 
such severe methodological problems , especially with regard to the regres-
sion artifact threat , that the evaluations should not have been undertaken 
since the conclusions were of such dubious validity and, henc e, potentially 
misleading. The rejoinder to this argument was that while the regression 
artifact problem was present in the data , the program was of such importance 
that an evaluation of it, even if only partially valid, was required for future 
policy decisions . The conflict here is be tween the preference for only highly 
valid program evaluations vs. the acceptability of "satisficing " evaluations 
under conditions of limited control over the research setting. The former 
position argues that a "bad " (i.e., methodologically suspect) eva luation is 
worse than no evaluation at all, whereas the latter position contends that the 
validity of an evaluation is a matter of degree and that some information about 
program success is better than no information at all. 
A third major area of value conflict lies in the emphasis upon the "Sc ien tific 
Method " as the correct model for program evaluation. The dispute often 
centers upon the quantification of program objectives and measur es of pro-
gram success. The conflict becomes readily apparent when one contrasts the 
views of the program personnel with those of the academic researc her. An 
example of this can be found in the area of volunteer programs in courts and 
corrections. The academic researcher will call for objective measures , such as 
the probability of recidivism , whereas the volunteer will stress more subjec-
tive impressions like "the person feels better about himself and is much more 
able to relate to others." In our research in this area, we have run across 
statements such as "It's impossible to quantify the effectiveness of one-to-one 
counseling because it is such a personal matter. " A further contention is that 
quantification tends to force concepts, such as program objectives and effec-
tiveness criteria into unrealistic and impractical categories which lose much of 
the "esse nce" of the program as it operates and affects people 's lives. The 
converse position is that these types of qualitative impressions are not objec-
tive indicators and are totally limited to personal perceptions and subjective 
interpretations, hence , they do not provide unambiguous measures of pro-
gram goals or the extent to which these goals have been achieved. 
2See the following: Donald T. Campbell and Albert Erlebacher, " How Regression Artifacts 
in Quasi-Experimental Evaluations Can Mistakenly Make Compensatory Education Look Hann-
ful, · in J. Hellmuth (ed. ), Compensatory Education: A ational Debate, Vol. 3, Disadvantaged 
Child (N. Y.: Brunn er/ Hazel, 1970), 185-210; Victor G. Cicirelli , "The Relevance of the Regres-
sion Artifact Problem to the Westinghouse Ohfo Evaluation of Head-Start: A Reply to Cam.J?bell 
and Erlebacher," in J . Hellmuth , op. cit., 211-215; John W. Evans and Jeffry Schiller , · How 
Preoccupation with Possible Regression Artifacts Can Lead to a Faulty Strategy for the Evaluation 
of Social Action Program s: A Reply to Campb II and Erlebacher, " in J. Hellmuth , op. cit., 
216-220. 
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The conflict seems to center on the preference for "analytical objectivity " 
vs. the preference for a more personalized approach which evaluates a pro-
gram in terms of the qualitative differences resulting from program participa-
tion . 
A variant of this conflict is very pronounced in the area of "human ex-
perimentation. "3 One argument is that you can't experiment with people's 
emotions, feelings, beliefs , etc., but rather these must be approached within a 
mor e subjective inter-personal mode of analysis. The converse position is that 
experimentation is the most valid means for testing hypothesized causal 
relationships between program activities and measurable changes in 
program-relevant behavior. One might contend this conflict goes even deeper 
and relates to the point made above concerning the "control group dilemma" 
whereby services are withheld from a group in order to provide a baseline 
from which to measure program effect. The anti-experimentalist would argue 
that it is wrong to withhold a needed service to satisfy a methodological 
requirement , such as random assignment to treatment and control groups. 
Besides , the impersonal nature of the random assignment procedure negates 
the essential "humanity " of the program. The pro-experimentation person 
would counter that , in the more realistic situation of scarce resources and 
competing claims for resources , the random assignment procedure is actually 
the "fairest" means of allocating the available resources since everyone has an 
equal chance of being selected to receive the program service. 
A fourth area of value conflict concerns the "proper " role of the program 
evaluator. This assumption posits that the primary job of the program 
evaluator is to measure the extent to which a program achieves its objectives, 
and not to question either the social utility of the objectives, or the values 
upon which they are based. This view conceives of the program evaluator as a 
"neutral " analyst whose job is to evaluate program success in terms of the 
objectives as stated by the responsible program agency. The question here is 
not only can the evaluator be a completely neutral observer but also should he 
be a neutral observer? An example might point up the potential dilemma 
here. It could be argued that the most efficient way to reduce the probability 
of a person convicted of murder being a repeater of that crime is to implement 
a program of capital punishment. Likewise , one might argue that an effective 
way of dealing with convicted rapists would be to castrate them, a la the Billy 
Graham suggestion of a few years ago. Is the proper role of the program 
evaluator merely to assess the extent to which these types of programs achieve 
their objectives or does he have a responsibility to question the values which 
3 See for examp le, Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas J. Cook, "Ex perim ental Design in Policy 
Impact Analysis." Social Science Quarterly 54 (September, 1973) 271-280. 
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und erlie th e pro gram s? Th at is, should he choose be twee n th e value of a 
short-run redu ction in crimin al activity vs. th e valu e of pr ese rving hu man life 
and re lated capacities in th e hopes of futur e rehabilit ation? 
To conside r an oth er exampl e: Suppo se a resea rcher has bee n commi s-
sioned to evalu ate a pr ogram which has the prim ary objec tive of increasing the 
absolute reading level of black childr en loca ted in severa l ghetto kind ergarten 
classes. Suppo se, howeve r , th at his own pr efe rence is for a pr ogra m designed 
to reduce the gap betwee n th e readin g leve l for black childr en and th at of 
middl e-class, whit e childr en located in se lec ted suburb an schools. In the 
latte r instance, th e perform ance leve ls of th e whit e childr en would constitut e 
th e stand ard by whi ch th e pro gram is eva luated rath er th an th e pr e-progra m 
leve ls of the black childr en . Th e situ ation confrontin g th e eva luator is fairly 
clea r . Do es th e evaluator acce pt th e objective as se t forth in th e official 
pro gram statement and use thi s as th e stand ard for evaluatin g th e pro gram, or 
does he exe rcise an ind epend ent jud gment in challenging th e ultim ate social 
value of th e obj ec tive and becom e an advocate for a diffe rent se t· of pro gram 
objectiv es and , con sequ entl y, a diffe rent se t of evaJuativ e crit e ria? Moreove r, 
should th e evalu ator emplo y his pr efe rred se t of evaluative crit e ria eve n if it 
may redu ce the acceptabilit y of his recomm end ation s by the spon sorin g 
age ncy and hind er th eir chan ces for futur e policy impl ementation ? As can be 
see n, th e choices made by the evalu ator in th ese typ es of situ ation s may have 
profound con sequ ences for th e condu ct of th e evaluation , th e kind of inform a-
tion it produ ces and th e possibilit y of affectin g futur e policy . 
A coroll ary point can be made rega rdin g th e perspec tive from which the 
pro gram is evaluated. In e mploying th e age ncy's pro gram obj ectives as th e 
perform ance stand ard , th e resea rcher is assumin g th at these objectives are 
consistent with th e nee ds of the client e le suppo sedly se rved by th e pro gram . 
Th e extent of con sistency, or incon sistency, be twee n official pro gram objec-
tives and client nee ds is, of cour se, very import ant if one evaluates th e 
pro gram from the perspec tive of th e client. Should th e pro gram evaluator 
mere ly assum e that a high degree of con sistency exists, or should he see k 
evidence conc ernin g thi s relationship ? If he finds a high degree of incon sis-
tency , what is his prop e r cour se of action regardin g the condu ct of th e 
evaluation ? In oth er word s, does he becom e a spok es man for th e client s of th e 
pro gram in deve lopin g effectiveness crit e ria whi ch reflec t th e ir extent of nee d 
satisfaction , or does he becom e an age ncy spok es man by evalu atin g th e 
pro gram in te rm s of th e obj ectives th at th e age ncy has identifi ed and upon 
which th e agency wishes th e pro gram to be evaluat ed? 
Th e point on th e prop er role of th e evaluator introdu ces anoth er area of 
disagree ment which has received consid erabl e att enti on in the lite ratur e. 
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This involves th e issue of whether or not the programs should be evaluated by 
people inside or outside of th e agency administering the program . 4 One 
position argues that the pro gram should be evaluated by people who are 
intim ate ly involved in the administration and impl ementation of the program 
because they have the grea test amount of familiarity with the program , 
und erstand the idiosyncratic features of program implem entation , and, con-
sequ ently , are in a better position to evaluate the success of the program. The 
converse position is that people involved in administering the program may 
have a vested int eres t in producing evaluations which show that the program 
is a success. Thu s, their involvem ent in , and commitment to , the program 
may bias their judgment and pr eclud e their being able to render an "objec-
tive" eva luation of program achievement. This position argu es that the evalua-
tion should be performed by a person from outside the administe1;ng agency 
who ha s the necessary "independence " to conduct an impartial evaluation. 
Th e outside evaluator would , in effect, lend an aura of legitimacy to the 
eva luation by his non-involvement (at leas t formally ) in the administration of 
the program . There is no easy solution to this dilemma and numerous people 
fall on both sides of the question. The choice rests upon the assumptions made 
concernin g the relativ e value of an "impartial" outside evaluation vs. an inside 
eval uation by people actively involved in the program who have a "fuller 
understanding " of the program 's opera tion . 
The final consideration involves an area which , perhaps in large part , 
affects all of the previously discussed issues. This entails the criteria for 
selecting programs to be evaluated. 5 Since , obviously , not all social programs 
have bee n, or will be , evaluated, choices are made to evaluate some programs 
and let oth er programs go unexamined. In the final analysis, these kinds of 
choices most directly relate to determining the value of program evaluation as 
a generator of decision-relevant information , since the general utility of 
evaluation will be largely determined by the type of programs evaluated. 
Several qu estions may be raised about what types of choices are made and the 
values they reflect. Is a program selected for evaluation because it does not 
involve a politically sensitive area and it would therefore be relatively easy to 
obtain the necessary cooperation for the evaluation? Is a program evaluated 
because it involves an area which has readily available data? Is a program 
selected because the researcher is confident that his recommendations would 
actually affect future policy? Is a program not evaluated because it has been in 
4 For a discuss ion of the pros and cons of each position see: Harry Hatry , et al., Practical 
Program Evaluation for State and Local Governments (Washington, D. C.: The Urban Institut e, 
1973). 
5 Caro l H. Weiss, "Where Politi cs and Evaluation Resea rch Mee t," Evaluation l (Novemb er, 
1973), 37-45. 
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existence for a long pe 1iod of tim e and has deve loped a powe rfu 1 supp or tive 
constitu ency? Th ese , and oth er exampl es which could be menti oned, all 
repr ese nt possible crit eria which might go int o th e dec ision to selec t a p ro-
gram for eva luation . As such , th ey reflec t both th e pr efe rences of th e re-
sea rcher and/or his pe rception s of th e realities end emic to th e potenti al 
evaluation settin g. In an y case , th e selec tion crit e ria not only serve to dete r-
min e whi ch pro gram s will be evaluated , but may provid e an indi cation of the 
futur e pro spec ts of a pro gram eve n before th e evaluation res ult s are obt ained 
in that th ey may reflec t th e pr edomin ant valu es, or pr efe rences , at a give n 
point in tim e . 
Conclusion 
In thi s pap er we have had th e luxury of rai sing, and not be ing forced to 
resolve, a numb e r of import ant issues involving confli ctin g value assumpti ons 
re lative to evaluative resea rch . Perhap s, as som e would argue, th ese issues 
escape a final resolution , and are bes t left to th e philo soph ers amon g us. We 
disagree. We fee l th at th ey are a leg itimat e conc ern of the policy analyst and 
mu st be addr esse d both in term s of explicatin g th e assumption s und erlying an 
evaluation and assess ing th e ir imp act up on policy recomm endation s. We tru st 
that thi s paper repr ese nt s a positive step in th at dir ection . 
